In order to guarantee a fair and transparent voting process, electronic voting schemes must be verifiable. Most of the time, however, it is important that elections also be anonymous. The notion of a verifiable shuffle describes how to satisfy both properties at the same time: ballots are submitted to a public bulletin board in encrypted form, verifiably shuffled by several mix servers (thus guaranteeing anonymity), and then verifiably decrypted by an appropriate threshold decryption mechanism. To guarantee transparency, the intermediate shuffles and decryption results, together with proofs of their correctness, are posted on the bulletin board throughout this process.
Introduction
Electronic voting is one of the most compelling applications of cryptography [3] . An approach popular in cryptographic literature is voting via a verifiable shuffle [25, 12, 18, 19, 21] , which consists of L voters V 1 , . . . , V L , M mix servers S 1 , . . . , S M (that are needed for the election to be anonymous) and N threshold decryption servers D 1 , . . . , D N (that are responsible for setting up the system and, in the end, tallying the results). This approach requires a secure rerandomizable encryption scheme, in which given the public key and a ciphertext c for some message m, one can efficiently find a random ciphertext c for the same message m. Further, it requires that there be a threshold realization of the cryptosystem [14, 27, 7] ; i.e., the secret key can be split up into "shares" such that each server can use its share to partially decrypt a ciphertext, and the correct decryption can be obtained by putting all the decryption shares together.
On a high level, once the decryption servers set up the system, a verifiable election works in the following three phases [24, 4] : first, each voter V i submits to a public bulletin board a ciphertext c (0) i containing his or her encrypted ballot (in one variation [25, 26, 2] , a trusted device submits this ciphertext on the user's behalf, so that the user does not know the randomness that went into forming the encryption and thus is unable to demonstrate that he voted a certain way). Next, in the ballot processing phase, each mix server S i in turn takes as input the set of encrypted ballots (c L ), together with a zero-knowledge proof π i that this was done correctly. The tally is now publicly computable by putting together the decryption shares for each ciphertext.
How much data does an elections monitor have to process in order to verify the tally? Suppose the monitor observes and verifies every step of both mixing and decrypting. This means verifying that, in the ballot processing step, the mix servers correctly formed LM ciphertexts, and then that the decryption servers correctly computed LN decryption shares. This multiplicative blow-up is very unfortunate if these algorithms are used on a large scale; indeed, the very vision of universally verifiable elections is that it should be easy for anyone, including the voters themselves, to participate in guaranteeing both the anonymity and the correctness of the election. This means that it should scale well as the number of mix and decryption servers grows. Can the work of the elections monitors be reduced to O(k(L + M + N )) for security parameter k?
(Note that a verifiable shuffle has the attractive property that the set of ballots output in the end is the same as the set of ballots that were encrypted and submitted to the bulletin board. In particular, this allows for write-in candidates. If an election is simply binary, then an encrypted tally can be computed if the underlying cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, and the resulting ciphertext can be decrypted by the decryption servers.)
In a recent result [8] , we (referred to ask CKLM in what follows to distinguish between our current and prior work) proposed an idea for overcoming this blow-up as far as the ballot processing phase was concerned. Before, all known aggregation results [1, 17] required complex interactions between shuffling authorities and, for non-interactive verification, were based on the Fiat-Shamir [16] heuristic and thus the random oracle model. The crucial observation of CKLM is that the monitor does not need to verify every step of the shuffle: it is sufficient to just verify the last set of ciphertexts (c
L ), as long as the proof π M produced by the last mix server S M attests to the fact that these were correctly computed from the original ballots (c ). To nevertheless allow π M to suffice for the entire shuffle, CKLM proposed a cryptographic tool, called controlled-malleable proofs (cmNIZKs), that allows each server S i to build on the proof π i−1 that attests to the validity of the ciphertexts (c importantly, cm-NIZKs allow π i to be the same size as π i−1 . As a result, the proof π M suffices, and the elections monitor need not verify any of the intermediate ciphertexts and proofs. CKLM then gave a construction of cm-NIZKs by taking advantage of certain convenient properties of GS proofs [23] .
The CKLM result came with a significant caveat that made it almost irrelevant in practice as far as verifiable shuffles are concerned: they used permutation matrices to represent the statement that there exists a permutation and a randomization that, when applied to (c . A permutation matrix is L × L, and so, by necessity, each proof π i was Θ(L 2 k) bits, for the security parameter k. The elections monitor would thus have to read Θ(k(L 2 + M )) bits in order to verify the correctness of a shuffle, rather than Θ(LM k) bits when using, for example, the verifiable shuffle of Groth and Lu [21] , which does require the monitor to check intermediate ciphertexts and proofs (hence the factor of M ), but in which each proof is only of size Θ(Lk) because Groth and Lu represent a permutation as a list rather than a matrix. The CKLM solution is therefore asymptotically superior only in the case where there are more mix servers than voters. In recent follow-up work, CKLM extended their results [10] in a way that would allow permutations to be represented as lists rather than matrices, but the extension does not apply for the scenario at hand because it can only tolerate a constant number of mix servers. A natural question, therefore, is the following: Is it possible to combine the CKLM techniques with the Groth-Lu techniques to get a cm-NIZK for the correctness of a shuffle of size Θ(k(L + M ))? In this paper, we answer it in the affirmative, obtaining a verifiable shuffle construction in which elections monitors only read Θ(k(L + M )) bits to verify that the ballot processing step was done correctly.
Next, we focus on the application of cm-NIZKs to the verification of threshold decryption (i.e., the tallying phase). In a naïve approach, each decryption server D i , on input the ciphertexts (c L ) that these decryption shares were correct. It is natural to ask whether, by taking turns processing these ciphertexts and using cm-NIZK techniques, it is possible to achieve compact verifiable threshold decryption, in which each server builds on the decryption share and proof of the previous server to arrive, at the end, at the vector of decryptions (m 1 , . . . , m L ) for the original L ciphertexts and a single vector of proofs (π
L ) that attests to the correct decryption and requires Θ(k(L + N )) bits to verify. In this paper we answer this question in the affirmative as well. Rather than have each decryption server produce its own decryption share and proof of correctness, we instead have the decryption servers pass around a single cumulative share, along with a malleable proof of correctness. When one authority receives the share and proof from the previous authority, it can therefore fold in its own share, and update, or "maul", the proof to obtain a new proof of correctness that takes into account this new share.
To the best of our knowledge, the question of compact verifiable threshold decryption has not been previously considered: the standard approach in threshold cryptography [14, 27, 7] is that, on input the ciphertext and a share of the secret key, each decryption server computes a share of the decryption and a proof that this share was computed correctly. These shares are then publicly output, and the decryption can be computed; one can verify that the decryption is correct by verifying the proofs. In a t-out-of-N threshold cryptosystem, t + 1 correct shares are sufficient, while no malicious coalition of t servers can break the security of the cryptosystem or cause incorrect decryption. An advantage of this approach is that no communication need be required between servers; in the public bulletin board model of electronic voting, however, this is not as important as compact verification. Our approach, instead, has the decryption servers communicate via the public bulletin board. Each server, in turn, takes as input the cumulative decryptions and their proofs of correctness so far (if any), carries out its share of the decryption, and outputs the resulting cumulative decryption shares and the resulting cumulative cm-NIZK proof of their correctness. The overall process results in the correct decryption if no server fails to produce a valid proof.
Definitions and Notation
In this section, we present building blocks and definitions for our voting scheme. First, we recall the malleable proof system due to CKLM [8] used by both our shuffle and threshold decryption constructions. Then, we give the CKLM definition of a verifiable shuffle, which takes into account that one proof is used to prove correctness of the entire shuffle. Next, we give a new definition, analogous to the definition for the shuffle, of compact threshold encryption; here, the malleable proof is used to prove correct partial decryption. Finally, in order to show that these two notions fit together, we present a simple definition of a secure voting scheme.
Controlled malleable proofs (cm-NIZKs)
As defined by CKLM, a controlled malleable proof for a relation R and transformation class T consists of four algorithms (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval): CRSSetup generates a common reference string crs, the prover P takes as input the crs, the instance x, and a witness w for the truth of the statement (x, w) ∈ R and outputs a proof π, and the verifier V takes as input the crs, an instance x, and a proof π and either accepts or rejects the proof.
These three algorithms constitute a regular non-interactive proof (which we define formally in Appendix A); such a proof is further called zero knowledge (NIZK) if there exists a PPT simulator (S 1 , S 2 ) such that an adversary can't distinguish between proofs formed by the prover and proofs formed by the simulator, and a proof of knowledge (NIZKPoK) if there exists a PPT extractor (E 1 , E 2 ) that can produce a valid witness from any accepting proof.
The fourth algorithm, specific to malleable proof systems, is ZKEval, which, on input crs, a transformation T = (T inst , T wit ) (in some transformation class T ), an instance x, and a proof π, outputs a mauled proof π for instance T inst (x). The main definition of CKLM for controlled malleable proofs then reconciles malleability with extractability (specifically, simulation-sound extractability [13, 20] ) and requires that, for any instance x, if an adversary can produce a valid proof π that x ∈ L R then an extractor can extract from π either a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R or a previously proved instance x and transformation T ∈ T such that x = T inst (x ). Intuitively this guarantees that any proof that the adversary produces is either generated from scratch using a valid witness, or formed by applying a transformation from the class T to an existing proof. They define this formally as follows:
Definition 2.1. [8] Let (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval) be a NIZKPoK system for an efficient relation R, with a simulator (S 1 , S 2 ) and an extractor (E 1 , E 2 ). Let T be an allowable set of unary transformations for the relation R such that membership in T is efficiently testable. Let SE 1 be an algorithm that, on input 1 k , outputs (crs, τ s , τ e ) such that (crs, τ s ) is distributed identically to the output of S 1 . Let A be given, and consider the following game:
• Step 3. (w, x , T ) ← E 2 (crs, τ e , x, π).
The proof system satisfies controlled-malleable simulation-sound extractability (CM-SSE, for short) with respect to T if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of SE 1 , A, and S 2 ) that V(crs, x, π) = 1 and (x, π) ∈ Q (where Q is the set of queried statements and their responses) but either (1) w = ⊥ and (x, w) / ∈ R; (2) (x , T ) = (⊥, ⊥) and either x / ∈ Q x (the set of queried instances), x = T inst (x ), or T / ∈ T ; or (3) (w, x , T ) = (⊥, ⊥, ⊥) is at most ν(k).
In addition, CKLM define the notion of strong derivation privacy for such proofs, in which simulated proofs are indistinguishable from those formed via transformation. This is defined formally as follows:
For a malleable NIZK (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval) with an associated simulator (S 1 , S 2 ), a given adversary A, and a bit b, let p A b (k) be the probability of the event that b = 0 in the following game:
• Step 3. If V(σ sim , x i , π i ) = 0 for some i, (x 1 , . . . , x q ) is not in the domain of T inst , or T / ∈ T , abort and output ⊥. Otherwise, form
The proof system is strongly derivation private if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible
. Putting these two definitions together, if a proof system is CM-SSE, strongly derivation private, and zero knowledge, then CKLM call it a cm-NIZK.
Compactly verifiable shuffles
In a compact verifiable shuffle, as defined by CKLM, a single (malleable) proof is used to prove the correctness of an entire multi-step shuffle. A compact verifiable shuffle (Setup, ShuffleKg, Shuffle, Verify) is parameterized by a re-randomizable encryption scheme (EncKg, Enc, Dec): Setup generates parameters params; ShuffleKg outputs key pairs (pk j , sk j ) chosen from a hard relation R pk that are used by mix servers as a stamp of participation; Shuffle takes the original ciphertexts {c i , π i } i , the shuffled ciphertexts {c i } i and proof thus far (π, {pk j } j ), and a pair of keys (pk m , sk m ) ∈ R pk , and outputs ({c i } i , π , {pk j } j ∪ {pk m }); and Verify ensures that the shuffle has been performed correctly.
Before giving the compact verifiability definition, we recall the relation that is proved by the shuffle. Instances are of the form (pk , {c i } i , {c i } i , {pk j } j ), where pk is a public key produced by EncKg, {c i } i are ciphertexts produced by Enc through the voting process, {c i } i are the shuffled ciphertexts, and {pk j } j are the public keys for R pk that are used to identify the mix servers that have participated in the shuffle thus far. Witnesses are of the form (ϕ, {R i } i , {sk j } j ), where ϕ is a permutation, {R i } i are re-randomization factors, and {sk j } j are the secret keys for the mix servers. Then the relation R is defined by
Definition 2.3. [8] Let (Setup, ShuffleKg, Shuffle, Verify) be a verifiable shuffle with respect to an encryption scheme (EncKg, Enc, Dec). For an adversary A and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, let p A b (k) be the probability that b = 0 in the following experiment:
• Step 2. A gets params, pk , T , and access to the following two oracles: an initial shuffle oracle that, on input ({c i , π i } i , pk ) for pk ∈ T , outputs ({c i } i , π, {pk } ) (if all the proofs of knowledge π i verify), where π is a proof that the {c i } i constitute a valid shuffle of the {c i } i performed by the user corresponding to pk (i.e., the user who knows sk ); and a shuffle oracle that, on input
• Step 3. Eventually, A outputs a tuple Then the shuffle is compactly verifiable if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function
In addition to defining such a shuffle, CKLM also provide a generic construction using a hard relation [11] , a proof of knowledge, and a cm-NIZK. Since we use this generic construction as a template for our shuffle construction in Section 3, for completeness we provide an outline of it in Appendix B.
Threshold encryption
As discussed in the introduction, the previous model for threshold encryption had each participant generate a share and proof of correctness separately; the proofs of correctness would then be verified separately, and the shares would all be combined at the end to produce the decrypted ciphertext. As we now assume that the participants compute a single share and proof cumulatively (by computing their own shares and then folding them into a single one that gets passed around and mauling the accompanying proof appropriately), the model must be changed to reflect these differences.
With this in mind, we define a threshold encryption scheme to be a tuple of four algorithms (EncKg, Enc, ShareDec, ShareVerify). The first, EncKg, generates a public encryption key pk , a verification key vk that is used to check the validity of a share, and a set of secret key shares {sk i } i . The next, Enc, performs regular public-key encryption. The next, ShareDec, takes in a share sk i of the secret key, a ciphertext c, and the decryption share/proof thus far. It first computes its own partial decryption of c, and then folds this value into the cumulative share and outputs this new share; it also mauls the proof to take into account that the value it has folded in is correct, and thus the new share is the correct cumulative share for the participants thus far. Finally, ShareVerify takes in the cumulative share and proof and verifies that the share is indeed correct. In this paper we focus on n-out-of-n threshold decryption, in which all n parties must participate in the decryption; our results should generalize to the t-out-of-n case as well, but we leave that as an open problem.
There are a number of desirable properties of a threshold encryption scheme. Functionally, we require completeness, which says that if everyone is behaving honestly then the scheme works as it should; i.e., the proofs of correctness verify and the ciphertexts decrypt correctly. Completeness therefore requires that the threshold encryption scheme also yields a regular encryption scheme: the Dec algorithm would take as input sk := {sk j } j and compute the cumulative shares; it would then output the final cumulative share, which by completeness is equal to the message m. This essentially means Dec(sk , c) = ShareDec(pk , vk , sk , c, (⊥, ⊥, ⊥)).
In terms of security properties, we would first like our scheme to satisfy IND-CPA security; to capture this, we can use the usual IND-CPA security experiment, in which an adversary A outputs message (m 0 , m 1 ) such that |m 0 | = |m 1 | and is asked to guess which one of them a challenge ciphertext c * encrypts. In addition to IND-CPA security, in the threshold setting we would also like to guarantee that partial decryption shares do not reveal anything about the secret key shares, even in the face of malicious participants (which also means that these malicious participants should not be able to recover the message without a sufficient number of collaborators). To capture this requirement, which we call share simulatability, we have the following definition: Definition 2.4. Let (EncKg, Enc, ShareDec, ShareVerify) be a threshold encryption scheme with N decryption participants. For an adversary A and a bit b, let p A b (k) be the probability of the event that b = 0 in the following game:
where (K, SD) are defined as (EncKg, ShareDec) if b = 0 and the following algorithms if b = 1:
Then the threshold encryption scheme is share simulatable if there exist PPT algorithms SimKg and SimShareDec as used above such that for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function
As SimShareDec can therefore simulate the decryption process without access to the secret key, we can argue that the shares produced by ShareDec do not reveal anything more than what an honest decryption would reveal. Finally, we require that the proof of correctness is meaningful; i.e., that it is hard for an adversary to produce a ciphertext c, a message m and an accepting proof π such that m = Dec(sk , c). More formally: Definition 2.5. Let (EncKg, Enc, ShareDec, ShareVerify) be a threshold encryption scheme with N decryption participants. For an adversary A, define the following game:
Then the threshold encryption scheme is sound if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability that ShareVerify(pk , vk , c,
Putting everything together, we say that a threshold encryption scheme is secure if it satisfies IND-CPA security, share simulatability, and soundness.
Compactly verifiable voting
In order for ballots to be cast and elections to be publicly verifiable, verifiable voting schemes use a public space (in practice, an append-only authenticated storage system) commonly referred to as a bulletin board. To describe an election, we break it up into several phases, which we describe here. To ease exposition, we implicitly assume that all parties are informed and agree about when a particular phase ends and the next one starts; e.g., by a particular symbol being written on the bulletin board.
• Setup. All authorities meet and jointly compute the public parameters of the election, while also keeping some correlated secrets private. All public parameters are published on the bulletin board.
• Voting. Each voter now uses these public parameters to encrypt his vote v and produce a ballot. All ballots are written on the bulletin board.
• Ballot processing. Next, once all ballots have been cast, they are examined to weed out invalid or duplicate ballots, and a set of mix authorities shuffle the remaining valid ballots.
• Tallying. Finally, a set of decryption authorities work together to decrypt the shuffled ballots.
After decryption, the actual count of the votes can be performed publicly.
This multi-phase model of elections is inspired by the work of Juels et al. [24] and Bernhard et al. [4] , although with some crucial modifications: unlike the former, we do not address coercion resistance, and unlike the latter we consider both shuffling and threshold decryption.
As far as security is concerned, there are a wide variety of properties we might want a voting scheme to satisfy; e.g., keeping users' votes private, coercion resistance, end-to-end verifiability, etc. In this paper, we focus mainly on this first property. As did Benaloh [3] , we observe that we can provide voter privacy only up to a certain point; for example, if the election consisted of only one vote (or only one vote not controlled by some adversary), then voter privacy would be quite difficult to enforce! We therefore follow Benaloh's approach in requiring that votes can be private only in elections in which different assignments of honest votes still lead to the same outcome. To capture this property formally, we say that an election with N decryption authorities, L voters, and M mix authorities satisfies basic vote privacy if, for a random bit b $ ← − {0, 1}, no PPT adversary A can win the following game with more than negligible advantage:
At the end of the setup phase (params, pk , vk ) are added to the bulletin board, and A gets to see {dk j } j∈S and T := {pk i } i .
• Voting. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary can either provide his own ballot B, or a vote pair (v 0 , v 1 ). For the former, the ballot is simply added to the bulletin board, while for the latter he gets back the ballot B b (i.e., the ballot corresponding to either v 0 or v 1 ), which is also added to the bulletin board. At the end of the phase (i.e., once there are L votes on the board), A automatically loses if the election outcome differs between b = 0 and b = 1.
• Ballot processing. In this phase, in addition to access to the bulletin board, we give the adversary access to two shuffle oracles: an initial shuffle oracle that, on input pk for pk ∈ T , writes ({c i } i , π, {pk } ) on the bulletin board (if all the ballots on the bulletin board are valid), where π is a proof that the {c i } i constitute a valid shuffle of the initial ballots {B i } i performed by the user corresponding to pk (i.e., the user who knows sk ); and a regular shuffle oracle that, on input ({c i } i , π, {pk j } j , pk ) for pk ∈ T , adds both ({c i } i , π, {pk j } j ) (if it cannot be found there already) and the shuffled ({c i } i , π , {pk j } j ∪ {pk }) to the bulletin board. The phase ends when the final shuffle ({c i } i , π, {pk j } j ) such that |{pk j } j | = M and {pk j } j ∩ T = ∅ is written to the bulletin board, either by the shuffle oracle or by the adversary.
• Tallying. The adversary can ask for decryption shares for the shuffled {c i } i through an oracle
and posts both (s k , I, φ k ) (if it cannot be found there already; s k = ⊥ and I = ∅ denotes an initial decryption) and the share (s k , I ∪ {j}, φ k ) with its new contribution. The phase ends when, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, the final decryption share (s i , [N ], φ i ) is written to the bulletin board, either by the share decryption oracle or by the adversary.
• Winning the game. The adversary outputs b , and wins if b = b.
While the above definition explicitly captures vote privacy, we could also attempt to extend it to deal with verifiability by requiring that, if π and φ i verify for all i, then the expected outcome (based on the v i and the decryption of c i in the adversary's ballots) should match the real outcome. While the soundness of the proofs used in our construction in Section 5 should guarantee that this holds, we focus solely on privacy in this work and leave a formal proof of verifiability as an interesting open problem.
A Compactly Verifiable Shuffle
In this section, we show how to achieve a compactly verifiable shuffle, as defined in Definition 2.3, with parameter size O(L) and proof size O(L + M ) by using the verifiable shuffle due to Groth and Lu [21] . To do this, we use the following outline: first, we show that an adapted version of the Groth-Lu construction is what CKLM call CM-friendly, meaning that a pairing-based cm-NIZK can be constructed based on it. We then observe that, once we have a cm-NIZK, we can plug it into the generic construction of CKLM to obtain a compactly verifiable shuffle.
In the definition of CM-friendliness as proposed by CKLM [8, Definition 4.3], they assigned the property of CM-friendliness to a relation and transformation; in the case of a shuffle, this relation and the set of transformations describe the permutation and randomization of ciphertexts, as we saw formally in Section 2.2. We propose a useful weakening of this definition that shifts the assignation of CM-friendliness from the relation to its specific instantiation using a sound proof system; as we will see, this allows the definition to accomodate computationally sound proofs (i.e., arguments) as well as the perfectly sound proofs that the previous definition required. We capture the previous definition as perfect CM-friendliness. Definition 3.1. For sets S and S of pairing product equations and a PPT setup algorithm params $ ← − CRSSetup(1 k ) that specifies some group G, we say that (S, S , CRSSetup) is a CM-friendly instantiation for a relation R and transformation class T if the following six properties hold:
1. Representable statements. Any instance and witness of R can be represented as a set of group elements; i.e., there is an efficiently computable invertible function F s (params, ·) that maps L R → G ds for some d s , and simlarly there is an efficiently computable invertible function F w (params, ·) that maps W R → G dw for some d w and W R := {w | ∃x : (x, w) ∈ R}. 2. Representable transformations. Any transformation in T can be represented as a set of group elements; i.e., there is an efficiently computable invertible function F t (params, ·) that maps T → G dt for some d t . 3. Provable statements. Proving satisfaction of the set S constitutes a computationally sound proof for the statement "(x, w) ∈ R" using the above representations for x and w; i.e., for
and F w (params, w) satisfy S, and (2) for a PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the randomness used in CRSSetup and A) that A can produce (X, W ) such that X and W satisfy S but (F −1 s (params, X), F −1 w (params, W )) / ∈ R is at most ν(k). 4. Provable transformations. Proving satisfaction of the set S constitutes a computationally sound proof for the statement "T inst (x ) = x for T ∈ T " using the above representations for x and T ; i.e., for params
, and F s (params, x ) satisfy S , and (2) for a PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the randomness used in CRSSetup and A) that A can produce (T , X, X ) such that T , X, and
5. Transformable statements. For any T ∈ T , the statement "(x, w) ∈ R" (phrased using S as above) can be transformed using some valid 1 set of transformations into the statement "(x,ŵ) ∈ R" wherex = T inst (x) andŵ = T wit (w). 6. Transformable transformations. For any T, T ∈ T , the statement "T inst (x ) = x for T ∈ T " (phrased using S as above) can be transformed using valid transformations into the statement
We say that (S, S , CRSSetup) is a perfect CM-friendly instantiation if the probabilities in the third and fourth properties are zero. A relation and transformation class (R, T ) are (perfectly) CMfriendly, if they have a (perfect) CM-friendly instantiation.
To instantiate the shuffle relation and transformations from Section 2.2, we combine the proof of hard relation instances of CKLM and an adapted version of the Groth-Lu protocol for the permutation proof. We omit the proof that the {pk j } j are the public keys for R pk in our exposition as it is unchanged from the original CKLM shuffle.
Our adapted version Groth-Lu protocol is slightly less efficient than theirs and achieves a weaker notion of zero knowledge (theirs is perfect whereas ours is computational) but a stronger notion of soundness (theirs achieves the slightly non-standard notion of L co -soundness, whereas ours is computationally sound). These tradeoffs seem necessary, as it is not clear how to accomodate the definition of CM-friendliness (or of a cm-NIZK or compact shuffle) to allow for L co -soundness. We first recall the assumptions used by Groth and Lu (which they prove secure in the generic group model):
it is hard to compute elements {µ i } i that are not all equal to 1 such that i e(µ i , g i ) = 1 and i e(µ i , γ i ) = 1.
Following Groth and Lu, the instantiation we use for the shuffle encryption scheme is BonehBoyen-Shacham (BBS) encryption [6] , which uses a prime-order bilinear group setting (p, G, G T , g, e)
with public keys of the form pk := (f, h) for f := g α and h := g β (for random α, β $ ← − F p ) and ciphertexts of the form c := (u, v, w) for u := f r , v := h s , and w := g r+s m (for the message m and r, s $ ← − F p ). Using this, we can show how to satisfy CM-friendliness, starting with CRSSetup(1 k ):
• CRSSetup(1 k ): First generate a prime-order bilinear group (p, G, G T , e, g). To allow for a shuffle over L ciphertexts, pick x 1 , . . . , x L $ ← − F p and set g i := g x i and γ i := g x 2 i for all i.
With this in place, we now describe how the six properties of CM-friendliness are met; in what follows, we highlight the involvement of the permutation by using ϕ(g i ) in place of g ϕ(i) (and similarly for other variables):
1. Representable statements. Because we are using BBS encryption, instances will use pk = (f, h), c i = (u i , v i , w i ), and c i = (u i , v i , w i ). We represent the witness as follows: to represent ϕ, we use (
Representable transformations. We represent T (ϕ,{R i } i ) = (T inst , T wit ) in the same form as witnesses; i.e., ({a i } i , {b i } i ) for ϕ and (f r i , h s i , g r i , g s i ) for all R i . 3. Provable statements. To prove that, under the public key pk = (f, h), the set of ciphertexts
and re-randomization represented by {(f r i , h s i , g r i , g s i )} i , we use the set S of pairing product equations defined as follows:
4. Provable transformations. To prove T inst (x ) = x for T ∈ T , we use the same equations from the above set S. We must additionally prove that the transformation does not change pk or {c i } i ; to do this, we form an augmented set S , which consists of all the equations in S as well as equations to check that these values stay fixed. More formally, if we represent X as
, then our extra checks ensure that pk = pk and
We can then run the checks in S using T inst as the witness and
as the instance. 5. Transformable statements. CKLM already show how to permute variables by a permutation ϕ and multiply re-randomization factors into ciphertexts using valid transformations; we therefore assume these operations exist and are valid. To change the statement (
, and T = (ϕ , {R i } i ), we therefore begin by permuting the values {(u i , v i , w i )} i , {a i } i , and {b i } i by ϕ ; this operation affects Equations 1 through 9 in S. We then multiply the additional randomness {R i } i into Equations 1 through 6, as well as Equations 10 and 11. 6. Transformable transformations. To change the statement T inst (x ) = x into T inst • T inst (x ) = T inst (x), we leave the additional checks in S (i.e., the checks that ensure that pk and {c i } i go unchanged) as they are. We then transform S as we did above using the values (ϕ , {R i } i ) specified in T inst , so that we permute the values {(u i , v i , w i )} i , {a i } i , and {b i } i by ϕ and multiply the additional randomness into Equations 1 through 6 and 10 and 11. Proof. To show this, we take an adversary A that can break one of the properties in Definition 3.1 with non-negligible probability and use it to construct an adversary B that can break either the Permutation Pairing or Simultaneous Pairing assumptions with the same probability . To start, B will get as input params := (p, G, G T , e, g, {g i } i , {γ i } i ), where g i = g x i and γ i = g x 2 i for all i. It can then pass params along to A. At some point, A will produce either a pair (X, W ) or a triple (T , X, X ). In the former case, the pair should be of the form (X :
s (params, X) and w := F −1 w (params, W ), one of three cases must hold: (1) x is not a valid (i.e., properly formatted) instance for R, (2) w is not a valid witness for R, or (3) (x, w) / ∈ R; i.e., {(u i , v i , w i )} i is not a permutation and re-randomization of {(u i , v i , w i )} i . We deal with each of these cases in turn.
We start by observing that the first case, in which X is not properly formatted, is in fact impossible. Looking at S, we know that it can be satisfied only by values in G; this means that in order for X to satisfy S, it must consist of elements in G and we can parse it as such. If we look first at the public key (f,
We next turn to the second case, in which W is not properly formatted. For the re-randomization factors {F i , H i , G ri , G si } i , we first observe that any two values F i , H i ∈ G can be written respectively as f r i and h s i , as if we write F i := g f i and H i := g h i for some f i and h i , we can set r i := f i /α and s i := h i /β. If additionally Equations 10 and 11 are satisfied, then we know that G ri = g r i and G si = g s i , so the re-randomization values have the appropriate form. This leaves as the only possibility the case in which the {a i } i and {b i } i do not actually represent a permutation ϕ. If this is true then we observe that, because S is assumed to be satisfied, in particular Equations 7, 8, and 9 will all be satisfied. Given ({a i } i , {b i } i ) that therefore satisfy these equations but do not represent a valid permutation, B can just output this tuple itself to break the Permutation Pairing assumption.
Finally, we look at the third case. In this case, we know that A has produced {(u i , v i , w i )} i and {(u i , v i , w i )} i such that the former is not a shuffle of the latter; this means that, for the permutation ϕ and re-randomization factors {f r i , h s i , g r i , g s i } i represented by W , there is an index i such that either (1)
To argue that none of these cases can in fact occur, we observe that because a i = ϕ(g i ), then for any set {x i } i it holds that
This means that, in Equation 1, we can substitute in i e(a i , ϕ(u i )) for i e(g i , u i ) and divide both sides by i e(a i , u i ) to get
Using a similar derivation for Equations 2 through 6, we can also see that
Note that each of the winning cases for A correspond to the case in which the right-hand side of the pairings are not equal to 1; e.g., if case 1 holds and
and similarly for the rest of the equations. In particular then, if case 1 holds then B can set
Because case 1 holds, it must be the case that there is at least one index i such that ϕ −1 (u i ) = u i ϕ −1 (f r i ) and thus µ i = 1; this means that B has a non-trivial set {µ i } i such that i e(g i , µ i ) = 1 and i e(γ i , µ i ) = 1 and can thus output this set to break the Simultaneous Pairing assumption. By analogous arguments, if case 2 holds then B can output
and if case 3 holds then it can output {w
As B therefore succeeds in each of the cases that A does, we know that if A outputs such a tuple (X, W ) with non-negligible probability , B can break either the Permutation Pairing or Simultaneous Pairing assumption with the same non-negligible probability.
If instead A outputs (T, X , X), the argument here is very similar to the one above. If the pk and {c i } i values in X and X are not the same, then we know that S will not be satisfied. Otherwise, we know by our outline above that S will be run on the remaining values. By all the same arguments as above, we therefore know that either it really is the case that X (or rather, the value represented by X) was obtained from X by transformation using T , or B can use these values to break either the Permutation Pairing or Simultaneous Pairing assumption.
To conclude, the params that B gives to A are distributed identically to those that A expects, so interactions with B are identical to honest interactions and A should succeed with the same nonnegligible probability . As B succeeds whenever A does, we therefore know that B will succeed with the same probability in breaking either the Permutation Pairing or Simultaneous Pairing assumption. Now that we have a CM-friendly instantiation for the shuffle relation, we can use the results of CKLM to construct a cm-NIZK for this relation. As we slightly weakened the notion of CMfriendliness, we argue in Appendix C that their results still carry through to produce a cm-NIZK; we mention here that our proof is nearly identical, as the notion of soundness used for cm-NIZKs is already computational.
Armed with our cm-NIZK, we now plug it into the generic verifiable shuffle construction of CKLM (given in Appendix B), which they already proved secure. We can even use the same representation of mix server keys as CKLM, which means pk j := g α j and sk j := h α j for α j $ ← − F p and h := g β for some β $ ← − F p . As for the size, looking at the construction above we see that the CRS must contain the g i and γ i elements for all i (and adding in the parameters for R pk adds only the single group element h), which means the parameters are of size O(L). For the proofs, Equations 9, 10, and 11 in S are required for every i, so the size of the proof is also O(L). In addition, a constant number of equations is required to check that (pk j , sk j ) ∈ R pk for every value of j; if the number of mix authorities is M , then this adds a proof component of size O(M ) and thus our total proof size is O(L + M ).
Threshold Decryption
In this section, we provide our construction of a threshold encryption scheme that satisfies the notions of security defined in Section 2.3; i.e., IND-CPA security, share simulatability, and soundness. We provide first a construction using a generic malleable NIZK proof of knowledge (NIZKPoK), and then describe how to instantiate this proof system concretely.
Our construction
In threshold decryption, the statement that each participant i wants to prove is that the share s he produces is a correct partial decryption of some ciphertext c. Formally, we represent instances as x = (vk c , c, s), where c is a ciphertext, and s is the cumulative decryption share produced by the combined user represented in vk c , and witnesses as (t, open), where t is a secret token (in our case, a bijection applied to the cumulative secret key) used to prove correctness of partial decryption, and vk c = Com(t; open) for some commitment scheme Com. The statement we want to prove is then
where F is the bijection between cumulative secret keys and tokens. ; the transformation is considered allowable ifŝ is a valid share using the tokent; i.e.,ŝ was computed using the secret key sk corresponding tot.
Our concrete instantiation uses BBS encryption [6] , which is multiplicatively homomorphic; this is why we multiply both the shares and the tokens to combine them. We also use a commitment scheme Com and a strongly derivation-private malleable NIZK proof of knowledge (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval). We will see later how to instantiate the NIZK concretely; for the commitment scheme (which we use to commit to the two components of t) we can use the instantiation of Groth-Sahai commitments under Decision Linear, which are almost identical to BBS encryption (and thus also multiplicatively homomorphic). We thus usually keep these parameters implicit.
• EncKg(1 k ): Generate crs (vk j , c, s j ), (t 1j , t 2j , open 1j , open 2j ) ), and output (s j , {j}, π). Otherwise, define vk c := i∈I vk i and check that V(crs, (pk , vk c , c, s), π) = 1; abort and output ⊥ if not. Otherwise continue and compute s j := u a j v b j and s := s · s j ; then set T := • ShareVerify(pk , vk , c, (s, I, π)): Parse vk = (crs, par, vk ) and output V(crs, (pk , i∈I vk i , c, s), π).
As the security of both BBS encryption and our cm-NIZK come from Decision Linear, we obtain the following theorem. (See Section 4.2 for our construction of cm-NIZKs for partial decryption.) Theorem 4.1. If Decision Linear holds in G then we can instantiate the above construction to obtain a secure threshold decryption scheme, as defined in Section 2.3.
To prove this, we must prove that four properties are satisfied: completeness, IND-CPA security, soundness, and share simulatability. The first of these, completeness, follows directly by inspection; similarly, for IND-CPA security, as we use BBS encryption, IND-CPA follows directly from their result and holds under Decision Linear.
For the latter two, we prove them using the security of the commitment scheme and NIZK. Interestingly, while the proof system is required to be malleable, strongly derivation private, and zero knowledge, for soundness we require not the strong notion of CM-SSE for cm-NIZKs, but instead regular extractability (i.e., we require the proof to be a proof of knowledge). Intuitively, the reason for this is that in the soundness game the adversary is not provided with simulated proofs, and we can therefore always expect to be able to extract a witness (rather than just a transformation as we do with CM-SSE).
Lemma 4.2. If (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval) is extractable and Com is binding, the threshold encryption scheme describe above is sound, as defined in Definition 2.5.
Proof. To prove this, we assume there exists an adversary A that can, with some non-negligible probability , produce a tuple (c, m, π) such that V(crs, (pk , i∈[N ] vk i , c, m), π) = 1 but m = Dec({sk i } i∈ [N ] , c), and use it to construct either an adversary B that breaks the extractability of the proof with some non-negligible probability B or an adversary C that breaks the binding of the commitment with non-negligible probability C . First, consider an alternate game G in which crs is chosen along with a trapdoor τ e , and after the adversary outputs (c, m, π), we run w ← E 2 (crs, τ e , (pk , i∈[N ] vk i , c, m), π) before evaluating the success condition. Note that since the real and extraction parameters must be indistinguishable, the adversary's success probability in this game can differ only negligibly from .
In this game, we observe that, if A produces (c, m, π), one of either two events must take place: for the witness w ← E 2 (crs, τ e , (pk , i∈[N ] vk i , c, m), π) extracted from π, either (x, w) / ∈ R (if this occurs and A succeeds we call this Event 0 ), or (x, w) ∈ R (if this occurs and A succeeds we call this Event 1 ). If Event 0 occurs with probability e 0 and Event 1 occurs with probability e 1 , then we know that = e 0 +e 1 , and thus either e 0 or e 1 is non-negligible; furthermore, we argue that B succeeds with probability e 0 and C succeeds with probability e 1 , meaning either B or C succeeds with non-negligible probability.
If Event 0 occurs with non-negligible probability, consider the following adversary B: it first receives as input (crs, τ e ). It then runs the rest of the code for EncKg honestly, and gives the resulting pk , vk = (crs, par, vk ), and {sk i } i to A. When A outputs (c, m, π) , B outputs (x := (pk , i∈[N ] vk i , c, m), π). Whenever Event 0 takes place, we know that the proof π verifies (because A succeeds), but for w ← E 2 (crs, τ e , x, π), (x, w) / ∈ R; this means that B wins the extractability game whenever Event 0 occurs. Note that this game is identical to G , so Event 0 occurs with probability exactly e 0 .
If, on the other hand, Event 1 occurs with non-negligible probability, we construct an adversary C that first receives as input par. It then generates crs along with the extraction trapdoor τ e , and then runs the rest of the code for EncKg honestly and gives the resulting pk , vk = (crs, par, vk ), and {sk i } i to A. 
To see that this tuple successfully breaks binding whenever Event 1 occurs, we observe that for A to win it must be the case that m = Dec({sk i } i , c); furthermore, we are also assuming (because Event 1 occurred) that (x, w) ∈ R and thus, according to Equation 1 there exists a value sk c = (a, b) (sk c , c) . Using the way we formed vk and the homomorphic property of the commitment, we already know that We therefore have a commitment vk c that opens to two values, (g a , g b ) and (g −1/α , g −1/β ), that are not equal, and thus binding is broken. Furthermore, as C succeeds whenever Event 1 occurs, it succeeds with probability e 1 .
Lemma 4.3. If (CRSSetup, P, V, ZKEval) is zero knowledge and strongly derivation private, and Com is hiding, the threshold encryption scheme described above is share simulatable, as defined in Definition 2.4. Define vk := (crs, par , {vk i } i ) and τ := (τ s , {sk i } i∈S A ), and output (pk , vk , {sk i } i∈S A , τ ).
SimShareDec(pk , vk , τ, (i * , c, s, I, π), m): Parse τ = (τ s , {sk i } i∈S A ), c = (u, v, w), and parse each secret key as
If this is the initial decryption (i.e., s = ⊥), compute π $ ← − S 2 (crs, τ s , (pk , vk i * , c, s i * )) and output (s i * , {i * }, π ). Otherwise, compute s := s · s i * , vk c := i∈I∪{i * } vk i , and π $ ← − S 2 (crs, τ s , (pk , vk c , c, s ) ). Output (s , I ∪ {i * }, π ).
With these algorithms in mind, we now argue that they satisfy the definition of share simulatability. We do this through the following series of game transitions:
• Game G 0 . The honest share simulatability game for b = 0, in which EncKg and Enc are used.
• Game G 1 . In Step 2 we switch to using a simulated CRS in pk , and in step 3 we switch to using simulated proofs in the SD oracle only if it is the initial decryption. As this involves switching directly from proofs produced by the honest prover P, under a CRS produced by the honest setup CRSSetup, to proofs produced by the simulator S 2 , under a CRS produced by S 1 , it is indistinguishable from G 0 by zero knowledge.
• Game G 2 . In Step 3 we switch to using simulated proofs in intermediate decryptions as well.
As this involves switching directly from proofs produced by ZKEval to ones produced by S 2 , it is indistinguishable from G 1 by strong derivation privacy.
• Game G 3 . In Step 3, we change the sole honest decryptor (corresponding to the one uncorrupted index i * ) to "fix" the share it outputs to be consistent with the message. More formally, it outputs a share s = m/w j∈S A u a j v b j , as described in SimShareDec above. To see that this share is in fact identical to the one produced in • Game G 5 . In Step 2, we change from using
. By the hiding property of the commitment scheme, and the fact that the commitment openings were unused as all proofs are simulated, this is indistinguishable from G 4 . Furthermore, this is now the honest share simulatability game for b = 1, in which SimKg and SimShareDec are used.
As each game was either indistinguishable from or identical to the preceding one, we can therefore conclude that G 0 is indistinguishable from G 5 , and thus an adversary cannot distinguish with more than negligible probability between the game for b = 0 and for b = 1.
A cm-NIZK for partial decryption
Given our concrete choices in the threshold encryption construction above, we must also show how to construct a strongly derivation-private malleable NIZKPoK for the relation R defined in Equation 1 . In fact, to use the same framework as in Section 3, we instead do something strictly stronger and show how to construct a cm-NIZK for this relation. We note that, for greater efficiency, one might instead directly construct a malleable NIZKPoK from Groth-Sahai proofs. (For example, one could use the following approach: include a commitment in the CRS and use Groth-Sahai to prove knowledge of an opening to the commitment or a valid witness, in a manner similar to that of the original FLS approach [15] . Intuitively, by the CKLM result on the malleability of Groth-Sahai OR proofs, the resulting proof is malleable using the same approach as below. It is furthermore zero knowledge and strongly derivation private because a simulator can use the opening to the commitment to form all the proofs and Groth-Sahai proofs are witness indistinguishable, and a proof of knowledge by the hiding property of the commitment scheme.) On the other hand, there may also be stronger definitions of threshold decryption for which cm-NIZKs would be necessary; we leave examination of such definitions as an open problem.
To now show that we can construct a cm-NIZK for this relation, we use the same outline as we did in Section 3; first, we show that we can satisfy the properties of CM-friendliness. Then, we can directly apply the results of CKLM to construct a cm-NIZK secure under the DLIN assumption.
• CRSSetup(1 k ): Generate and output a prime-order bilinear group (p, G, G T , e, g).
• Representable statements. Instances are of the form (vk c , c, s) , where vk c is a pair of commitments (A, B); as seen above, all these values (as well as the ciphertext c and decryption share s) are group elements. Witnesses,
, are group elements as well.
• Representable transformations. Transformations are represented by T = (ŝ,t, open). As these are of the same form as elements in instances/witnesses, we can represent them as group elements.
• Provable statements. To prove that the share s is a correct partial decryption of the ciphertext c = (u, v, w) performed using the cumulative secret key corresponding to the tokens t 1 and t 2 , committed to in A and B with openings open 1 and open 2 respectively, we can use the following set S (with Equations 2 and 3 expanded into the pairing product equations for verifying commitments as in previous work):
(1) e(s, g) = e(u, t 1 ) · e(v, t 2 ) · e(w, g), (2) A = Com(t 1 ; open 1 ), and (3) B = Com(t 2 ; open 2 ).
• Provable transformations. To prove T inst (x ) = x for T ∈ T , we must first prove that T inst does not change c; if we represent x = (vk c = (A, B), c, s) and x = (vk c = (A , B ), c , s ), this means checking that c = c . We also want to check that for T = (ŝ, (
it is the case that vk c incorporates the new commitments, t incorporates the new tokens, s incorporates the new share, andŝ is a valid share. This means that S consists of the following equations:
(1) e(c, g) = e(c , g),
e(s, g) = e(s , g) · e(ŝ, g), and (5) e(ŝ, g) = e(u,t 1 ) · e(v,t 2 ).
• Transformable statements. To change the statement (x, w) ∈ R into (T inst (x), T wit (w)) ∈ R, we use the fact that CKLM already showed that multiplying in constants is a valid transformation; i.e., is allowed for Groth-Sahai proofs. For T = (ŝ, (t 1 ,t 2 ), ( open 1 , open 2 )), we therefore add e(ŝ, g) to the left-hand side of Equation 1 in S and e(u,t 1 ) · e(v,t 2 ) to the right-hand side. We similarly change the commitment equations by adding Com(t 1 ; open 1 ) and Com(t 2 ; open 2 ) to the right-hand sides of Equations 2 and 3 respectively. • Transformable transformations. To change the statement If we use Groth-Sahai proofs for our sets S and S of pairing product equations, then we can achieve perfect extractability. In particular, unlike in Section 3, our representations of instances, witnesses, and transformations are now perfect; this means the entire proof system is perfectly extractable and thus we achieve perfect CM-friendliness.
A Secure Voting Scheme
In this section, we bring together the components constructed in the previous two sections to construct an electronic voting scheme from a compact verifiable shuffle (Setup, ShuffleKg, Shuffle, Verify), a secure threshold decryption scheme (EncKg, Enc, ShareDec, ShareVerify), and a simulation-sound extractable proof (CRSSetup, P, V).
• Setup. The voting authorities jointly compute the parameters params • Ballot processing. The mix authority with public key pk k picks the most recent valid shuffle ({c i } i , π, {pk j } j ); e.g., the one with the most public keys, or the one that has used the correct sequence of public keys (if an order has been imposed). It performs ({c i } i , π ) $ ← − Shuffle(params, {c i , π i } i , {c i } i , π, {pk j } j , (pk k , sk k )) and posts ({c i } i , π , {pk j } j ∪ {pk k }) to the bulletin board. The ballot processing phase ends once there is a valid sequence of shuffle proofs with sufficiently many mix authorities.
• Tallying. Let ({c i } i , π, {pk j } j ) be the completed shuffle. Each decryption authority looks for the valid decryption shares (s i , I, φ i ) with the largest set I. The k-th decryption authority
, φ i )) for all i and posts (s i , I ∪{k}, φ i ) on the bulletin board.
Theorem 5.1. The voting scheme outlined above satisfies basic voter privacy, as defined in Section 2.4.
To prove this, we proceed through a series of game transformations; formal proofs of their indistinguishability can be found in Appendix D:
• Game G 0 . The honest game with b = 0.
• Game G 1 . In the setup phase, we switch to using SimKg to generate the threshold keys, and in the tallying phase we switch to using SimShareDec. This is indistinguishable from G 0 by share simulatability (Definition 2.4).
• Game G 2 . In the tallying phase, we switch to giving m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) to SimShareDec instead of m i := Dec(sk , c i ) for all i, where ϕ is a random permutation. This is indistinguishable from G 1 by compact verifiability (Definition 2.3 ).
• Game G 3 . In the voting phase, we switch to using simulated proofs of knowledge π i . This is indistinguishable from G 2 by zero knowledge.
• Game G 4 . In the tallying phase, we switch to using m i := Extract(τ e , ϕ(π i )) for the adversarial ballots (c i , π i ); i.e., the value extracted from the permuted proof of knowledge. This is indistinguishable from G 3 by simulation-sound extractability (Definition A.2).
• Game G 5 . In the tallying phase, we switch to using m i := ϕ(v i0 ), where, for the i-th ballot, the adversary queried (v i0 , v i1 ) to its oracle. This is identical to G 4 by the correctness of the encryption scheme.
• Game G 6 . In the tallying phase, we switch to using m i := ϕ(v i1 ), where, for the i-th ballot, the adversary queried (v i0 , v 1i ) to its oracle. This is identical to G 5 because {v i0 } i and {v i1 } i are guaranteed to lead to the same election result.
• Game G 7 . In the voting phase, we switch to using Enc(pk , v 1 ) instead of Enc(pk , v 0 ). This is indistinguishable from G 6 by IND-CPA security.
• Game G 8 . In the tallying phase, we switch back to using m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) instead of v 1i for the ballots formed by query. This is again identical to G 7 by the correctness of the encryption scheme.
• Game G 9 . In the tallying phase, we switch back to using m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) instead of m i := Extract(τ e , ϕ(π i )) for the adversarially-formed ballots. This is again indistinguishable from G 8 by simulation-sound extractability.
• Game G 10 . In the voting phase, we switch back to using honest proofs of knowledge; this is again indistinguishable from G 9 by zero knowledge.
• Game G 11 . In the tallying phase, we switch back to using m i := Dec(sk , c i ) instead of m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )). This is again indistinguishable from G 10 by compact verifiability.
• Game G 12 . In the setup phase, we switch back to using EncKg and ShareDec instead of SimKg and SimShareDec. This is again indistinguishable from G 11 by share simulatability, and is now the honest game for b = 1.
are satisfied. A NI proof system is extractable if, in addition, the extractability property below is satisfied. A NI proof system is witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) if the witness-indistinguishability property below is satisfied. An NI proof system is zero-knowledge (NIZK) if the zero-knowledge property is satisfied. A NIZK proof system that is also extractable constitutes a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof of knowledge (NIZKPoK) system. A NIWI proof system that is also extractable constitutes a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge (NIWIPoK) system.
1. Completeness [5] . For all crs $ ← − CRSSetup(1 k ) and (x, w) ∈ R, V(crs, x, π) = 1 for all proofs π $ ← − P(crs, x, w).
2. Soundness [5] . For all PPT A, and for crs $ ← − CRSSetup(1 k ), the probability that A(crs) outputs (x, π) such that x / ∈ L but V(crs, x, π) = 1 is negligible. Perfect soundness is achieved when this probability is 0. 3. Extractability [22] . There exists a PPT extractor E = (E 1 , E 2 ) such that E 1 (1 k ) outputs (σ ext , τ e ), and E 2 (σ ext , τ e , x, π) outputs a value w such that (1) any PPT A given σ cannot distinguish between the honest CRS and one output by E 1 ; i.e.,
Pr[crs
• Step 2. (x, π) $ ← − A S 2 (crs,τs,·) (crs, τ e ).
• Step 3. w ← E 2 (crs, τ e , x, π).
Then the NIZKPoK satisfies simulation-sound extractability if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of SE 1 , A, and S 2 ) that V(crs, x, π) = 1 but (x, π) / ∈ Q (where Q is the set of S 2 queries and their responses) and (x, w) / ∈ R is at most ν(k).
B The Shuffle Construction of CKLM
Recall from Section 2.2 that a compactly verifiable shuffle is a tuple (Setup, ShuffleKg, Shuffle, Verify), defined with respect to an re-randomizable encryption scheme (EncKg, Enc, Dec, ReRand). The construction given by CKLM of such a shuffle combines a hard relation with generator G, a proof of knowledge (CRSSetup, P, V), and a cm-NIZK (CRSSetup , P , V ):
Output params := (crs, crs ).
• ShuffleKg(params): For each mix authority i, generate (pk i , sk i )
). Parse params = (crs, crs ). Each user i now picks randomness r i and encrypts his message m i as c i := Enc(pk , m i ; r i ); he also forms a proof of knowledge
First check if this is the initial shuffle by checking if π = ⊥ and {c i } i = {pk j } j = ∅. If it is, check that V(crs, c i , π i ) = 1 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if this check fails for some i, abort and output ⊥. Otherwise, pick a random permutation ϕ $ ← − S n and compute c i $ ← − ReRand(pk , ϕ(c i )) for all i. Next, form a proof π for the shuffle performed by the user in possession of the secret key corresponding to pk 1 (i.e., the initial mix server).
Otherwise, if this is not the initial mix server, check that V (crs , (pk , ({c i } i , {c i } i , {pk j } j ), π) = 1; if this check fails abort and output ⊥. Otherwise, continue by choosing a random permutation ϕ $ ← − S n and randomness {R i } i for the encryption scheme, and computing c i $ ← − ReRand(pk , ϕ(c i ); R i ) for all i. If the public key for the current mix server is pk k define
• Verify(params, {c i , π i }, {c i }, π, {pk j }): Check that V(crs, c i , π i ) = 1 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if this fails for any i abort and return 0. Otherwise, check that V (crs , ({c i }, {c i }, {pk j }), π) = 1; again, if this fails output 0 and otherwise output 1.
As proved by CKLM, this construction constitutes a secure compactly verifiable shuffle (as defined in Definition 2.3).
C Constructing a cm-NIZK Using CM-Friendliness
In Section 3, we saw our modified definition for CM-friendliness that weakened the CKLM definition to allow for computationally sound proofs in addition to ones that are perfectly sound. As we would like to argue that, for a relation R and transformation class T , any instantiation (S, S , CRSSetup) meeting our definition still allows us to construct a cm-NIZK, we prove here a modified version of the corresponding theorem from the full CKLM paper [9, Theorem 4.1]:
Theorem C.1. Given a derivation-private NIWIPoK (CRSSetup pp , P pp , V pp , ZKEval pp ) that is malleable for the set of all valid transformations and a structure-preserving signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify), if (S, S , CRSSetup) is a CM-friendly instantiation for some relation and transformation class (R, T ) then we can construct a cm-NIZK for (R, T ).
Proof. Let R be the relation
needed by the generic construction of CKLM; our goal is to embed this relation into a set of pairing product equations using the underlying sets S and S . By the definition of S and S and CMfriendliness, we know that (x, w) ∈ R implies that F s (params, x) and F w (params, w) satisfy S (for
, and if values X and W satisfy S then with overwhelming probability (F −1 s (params, X), F −1 w (params, W )) ∈ R. We similarly have that if x = T inst (x ) for T ∈ T then F s (params, x), F s (params, x ), and F t (params, T ) satisfy S , and that the reverse direction is also true with overwhelming probability. Finally, by the definition of a structure preserving signature, there exists a set of pairing product equations S σ such that Verify(vk , σ, x ) = 1 if and only if vk , F s (params, x ), and σ satisfy S σ .
Looking at these three equations, we observe that S σ and S share the variables in F s (params, x ); without loss of generality, we assume that these are the first n variables in each. We then set x pp := Or(S (F s (params, x) ), And(S σ (vk ), S (F s (params, x)); n))
and w pp := Or w (S(F s (params, x)), And(S σ (vk ), S (F s (params, x)); n), F w (params, w),
Using such an instance and witness, it is straightforward to check that if ((x, vk ), (w, x , T, σ)) ∈ R then (x pp , w pp ) ∈ R pp , where R pp consists of all statements than can be proved using pairing product equations. We can therefore implement a NIWIPoK for R as follows:
and output crs := (crs pp , params).
• P(crs, x, (w, x , T, σ)): Let x pp and w pp be as defined in Equations 2 and 3 respectively, and return π $ ← − P pp (crs pp , x pp , w pp ).
• V(crs, x, π): Again, let x pp be as defined in Equation 2, and output V pp (crs pp , x pp , π).
• ZKEval(crs, T, x, π): Let T s := s(T ) and T t := Lift(id, t(T )), where s(T ) and t(T ) are the respective transformations on statements and transformations defined by CM-friendliness. Output ZKEval pp (crs, LR(T s , T t ), π).
In their Theorems B.1 and B.3 [9] , CKLM show that LR(T s , T t ) is a valid transformation that turns an instance x pp into an instance (F s (params, x) )), And(S σ (vk ), t(T )(S (F s (params, x)); n))). To start, A specifies the sets S and T of mix and decryption authorities it wants to corrupt. B then specifies the same set S in its own game and gets (pk , vk , {sk i } i∈S ) in return. It then generates all the parameters for the shuffle itself, and gives all the appropriate values to A. During the voting and ballot processing phases, B behaves completely honestly (by encrypting v 0 and performing the honest shuffle). During the tallying phase, if A queries the ShareDec oracle on input (j, k, s k , I, φ k ), B sends the query (j, c k , s k , I, φ k ) to its SD oracle and publishes the resulting (s , I ∪ {j}, π ) to the bulletin board. Finally, if A guesses G 0 then B guesses b = 0, and if B guesses G 1 then B guesses b = 1.
To see that interactions with B are indistinguishable from those that A expects, we observe that the only phase in which B is not behaving completely honestly is the tallying phase. Here, if the keys B gave to A were generated by EncKg and its SD oracle is using ShareDec then B is executing the exact code of G 0 , while if the keys were generated by SimKg and the SD oracle is using SimShareDec, it is executing the exact code of G 1 . A will therefore have the same advantage when interacting with B; as B furthermore guesses correctly whenever A does, B will succeed at the threshold security game with the same advantage.
Next, we switch in Game G 2 to using m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) in the share decryption oracle instead of m i := Dec(sk , c i ), where ϕ is a random permutation. Proof. To prove this, we show that if there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 1 and G 2 with some non-negligible advantage then we can use it to construct an adversary B that wins at the compact verifiability game with the same advantage.
To start, B gets as input params, the encryption key pk , and T := {pk i }. It now generates all the threshold parameters using SimKg(pk , N, S), and gives the parameters and the appropriate keys for the corrupted parties to A. In the voting phase, B behaves completely honestly. In the ballot processing phase, when A queries its initial shuffle oracle B will query its own initial shuffle oracle, and when A queries the regular shuffle oracle B will query its own shuffle oracle. When the final shuffle ({c i }, π, {pk j }) gets posted, B outputs ({c i , π i }, {c i }, π, {pk j }). If the game continues (i.e., this tuple is valid), then B gets back some collection {m i }. In the tallying phase, when B is queried on a tuple (j, k, s k , I, φ k ), it computes the code of SimShareDec honestly, using m k as input. At the end, if A guesses G 1 then B guesses b = 0, and if A guesses G 2 then B guesses b = 1.
To see that interactions with B are indistinguishable from the ones that A expects, we observe that the parameters B gives to A are identical to what they would be in either game, as is its behavior in the voting phase. As for the shuffle, B's behavior is again identical to both games. As for the tallying phase, if b = 0 then B gets back {m i := Dec(sk , c i )}, which means it is executing the exact code of G 1 . Similarly, if b = 1 then B gets back {m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) for a random permutation, which means it is executing the exact code of G 2 . As A will therefore have the same advantage when interacting with B, and furthermore B guesses correctly whenever A does, B will succeed with advantage .
Next, we switch in Game G 3 to using simulated proofs of knowledge in the voting phase.
Lemma D.3. If the proof (CRSSetup, P, V) is zero knowledge, then Game G 3 is indistinguishable from G 2 .
Proof. To prove this, we show that if there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 2 and G 3 with some non-negligible advantage then we can use it to construct an adversary B that breaks zero knowledge with the same advantage.
To start, B gets as input a CRS crs. It then forms all the other parameters as in G 2 , and gives the parameters and the appropriate keys for the corrupted parties to A. In the voting phase, if A outputs a query of the form (v 0 , v 1 ), B will pick some randomness r for the encryption scheme and form c $ ← − Enc(pk , v 0 ). It then queries its own oracle on ((pk , c), (v 0 , r)) to get back a proof π, and returns (c, π) to A. In both the ballot processing and tallying phases, B behaves exactly as in both G 2 and in G 3 . At the end of the game, if A guesses G 2 then B guesses it is interacting with the prover on an honest CRS, and if A guesses G 3 then B guesses it is interacting with the simulator on a simulated CRS.
To see that interactions with B are identical to the ones that A expects, we observe that the value of the CRS and the proofs π are the only way in which B is not identical to both games. Furthermore, if the CRS is an honest CRS and the proofs π are formed by the prover then B is executing the exact code of G 2 , while if the CRS and proofs are both simulated then B is executing the exact code of G 3 . A will therefore have the same advantage when interacting with B; furthermore, as B guesses correctly whenever A does, it guesses correctly with the same advantage.
Next, we switch in Game G 4 to extracting from the proofs rather than decrypting the ciphertexts; i.e., for adversarially-generated ballots (c i , π i ), we use (crs, τ s , τ e ) $ ← − SE 1 (1 k ) and m i := Extract(τ e , ϕ(π i )) instead of m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )).
Lemma D. 4 . If the proof system (CRSSetup, P, V) satisfies simulation sound extractability, as defined in Definition A.2, then Game G 4 is indistinguishable from G 3 .
Proof. To prove this, we show that if there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 3 and G 4 with some non-negligible advantage then we can use it to construct an adversary B that breaks simulation-sound extractability with some related non-negligible probability . We first observe that, in order to distinguish between the games, there must exist some index i such that Extract(τ e , ϕ(π i )) = Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )), as otherwise the two games are identical.
To start, B will get as input (crs, τ e ). It now computes all the other parameters completely honestly, and gives the parameters and the appropriate keys for the corrupted parties to A; note that this means it will also know the decryption key sk . In the voting phase, if A outputs a query of the form (v 0 , v 1 ), B will form c $ ← − Enc(pk , v 0 ) and query its S 2 oracle on (pk , c) to get back a proof π; it then returns (c, π) to A and posts it to the bulletin board. If A instead posts its own ballot (c, π), B checks that Dec(sk , c) = Extract(τ e , π). If this check fails, then B outputs ((pk , c), π), and otherwise it continues the game. If it reaches the end of the voting phase without observing such a ballot, B aborts and outputs ⊥.
To see that interactions with B are indistinguishable from those that A expects, we observe that if Dec(sk , c) = Extract(τ e , π), then B is in fact executing the code of both games completely honestly. If Dec(sk , c) = Extract(τ e , π), then B has output a tuple ((pk , c), π) such that w := Extract(τ e , π) but w = Dec(sk , c), meaning ((pk , c), w) / ∈ R. In any case in which A could distinguish between the games, B therefore wins at its game, meaning that if A distinguishes with some non-negligible advantage , B will successfully output such a tuple with probability .
Next, in Game G 5 , we switch away from decrypting for the ballots produced by query as well; as the proofs here are simulated and thus we cannot extract from them, this means that, if the behaves identically to both games the rest of the time, A will have the same advantage with B as it does in distinguishing games 6 and 7. As B succeeds in guessing whenever A does, B will also succeed with non-negligible advantage and thus B will succeed with advantage /q. Now that we are using b = 1 (i.e., encrypting right-hand votes), we can switch everything else back. In Game G 8 , we switch back to using m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) for query-generated ballots; this is identical to G 7 by the completeness of the encryption scheme, and the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma D.5. In Game G 9 , we switch back to using m i := Dec(sk , ϕ(c i )) for adversariallygenerated ballots; this is indistinguishable from G 8 by simulation-sound extractability, and the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma D.4. Next, in Game G 10 , we switch back to using honest proofs of knowledge; this is indistinguishable from G 9 by zero knowledge, and the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma D.3. Next, in Game G 11 , we switch back to using Dec(sk , c i ); this is indistinguishable from G 10 by compact verifiability, and the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma D.2. Finally, we switch back to using EncKg and ShareDec in the tallying phase; this is indistinguishable from G 11 by share simulatability, and the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma D.1.
